PROMSVYAZ
Open Joint-Stock Company PROMSVYAZ
UNP: 100299757 · 18 P. Brovki St., Minsk, 220013
Identification
Financial statements
k BYN
| Line item | Reporting year | Prior year |
|---|---|---|
| Fixed assets | 21 508 | 19 727 |
| Intangible assets | 2 | 4 |
| Investments in long-term assets | 34 | 3 |
| Deferred tax assets | 57 | 61 |
| Long-term receivables | 3 | 6 |
| Total Section I (long-term assets) | 21 604 | 19 801 |
| Inventories | 21 029 | 13 490 |
| — materials | 15 802 | 5 031 |
| — work in progress | 4 352 | 7 334 |
| — finished goods and merchandise | 875 | 1 125 |
| Deferred expenses | 11 | 39 |
| VAT on acquired goods, works, services | — | 11 |
| Short-term receivables | 3 157 | 7 162 |
| Short-term financial investments | — | 4 388 |
| Cash and cash equivalents | 7 455 | 3 729 |
| Other short-term assets | 11 | — |
| Total Section II (short-term assets) | 31 663 | 28 819 |
| BALANCE (assets) | 53 267 | 48 620 |
| Charter capital | 2 846 | 2 846 |
| Reserve capital | 262 | 254 |
| Additional capital | 22 548 | 20 577 |
| Retained earnings (uncovered loss) | 22 643 | 20 384 |
| Total Section III (equity) | 48 299 | 44 061 |
| Long-term loans and borrowings | — | — |
| Deferred income | 884 | 386 |
| Total Section IV (long-term liabilities) | 884 | 386 |
| Short-term loans and borrowings | — | — |
| Short-term payables | 4 001 | 3 775 |
| — to suppliers, contractors, providers | 3 591 | 2 545 |
| — on taxes and duties | 41 | 927 |
| — on payroll | 169 | 144 |
| Deferred income | 72 | 387 |
| Provisions for future payments | 11 | 11 |
| Total Section V (short-term liabilities) | 4 084 | 4 173 |
| BALANCE (equity and liabilities) | 53 267 | 48 620 |
Computed metrics
Integrity checks
Checks passed: 6 of 6
Signals
- Operating cash flow slightly negative: −286k BYN (recovered from −2,734 a year earlier). Accrued 2025 profit did not convert into operating cash — it went into working capital.
- Sharp inventory build-up: materials tripled (5,031 → 15,802k BYN), inventories overall +56% (13,490 → 21,029). Against +68% revenue this looks like a production ramp-up, but it warrants monitoring. The build-up was funded by winding down short-term financial investments (4,388 → 0) and collecting receivables (7,162 → 3,157), not by debt.
- Strong and growing profitability: profit on sales ×4 (863 → 3,487k BYN), net profit ×3.4 (764 → 2,623). Sales profitability 14.7%, net 11.1%.
- Revenue +67.7% (14,106 → 23,650k BYN) — real growth, confirmed by a 115% rise in gross profit, not by revaluation.
- Liquidity many times above norm: current ratio 7.75 (norm ≥1.25); own-working-capital provision 0.84 (norm ≥0.15).
- No interest-bearing debt at all — neither long- nor short-term loans in either year.
- Equity is growing (44,061 → 48,299k BYN), 91% of the balance sheet is equity-financed; cash grew 3,729 → 7,455.
- Dividends paid and growing (339 → 371k BYN) — to the state and to individuals; a sign of stability and of returns flowing back to the state.
Recommendation
OJSC PROMSVYAZ is a manufacturer of communication equipment in republican ownership (state share 99.7%) under the line ministry of communications. In 2025 the enterprise posted strong growth: revenue rose 67.7% (14,106 → 23,650k BYN), profit on sales quadrupled (863 → 3,487), and net profit tripled (764 → 2,623). Sales profitability is 14.7% and net profitability 11.1%. The growth is operational and confirmed by gross profit (+115%) rather than one-off items.
The financial position is stable and needs no state investment: there is no interest-bearing debt at all, 91% of the balance sheet is equity-financed, liquidity is many times above norm (current ratio 7.75), capital is building on real retained earnings, and dividends are paid and rising. The only area to watch is the slightly negative operating cash flow (−286k BYN, recovered from −2,734): accrued profit went into an inventory build-up (materials tripled), which against 68% revenue growth looks like a production ramp-up but warrants monitoring next period.
Privatization is recommended: the financial condition is self-sufficient, and state control of the enterprise is not strategically necessary in itself. With an important caveat: producing communication equipment under the line ministry may carry sensitivity from a national-interest standpoint. This is a matter of buyer selection rather than an obstacle to privatization: a sale to a large domestic player creating a monopoly is undesirable; foreign bidders are considered individually through the dedicated asset-assessment mechanism. The decision should weigh the buyer's profile on a par with price.