Goryn BMP
OJSC "Goryn Building Materials Plant"
UNP: 291161560 · 96 Kommunisticheskaya St., Rechitsa workers' settlement, Stolin District, Brest Region
Identification
Financial statements
k BYN
| Line item | Reporting year | Prior year |
|---|---|---|
| Fixed assets | 9 933 | 10 306 |
| Intangible assets | 6 | 17 |
| Income-bearing investments in tangible assets | 0 | 0 |
| Investments in long-term assets | 620 | 547 |
| Long-term financial investments | 4 | 4 |
| Long-term receivables | 0 | 0 |
| Total Section I (long-term assets) | 10 563 | 10 874 |
| Inventories | 3 940 | 4 391 |
| — materials | 1 254 | 1 338 |
| — work in progress | 294 | 245 |
| — finished goods and merchandise | 2 392 | 2 808 |
| — goods shipped | 0 | 0 |
| Deferred expenses | 30 | 44 |
| VAT on acquired goods, works, services | 0 | 1 |
| Short-term receivables | 1 130 | 1 380 |
| Short-term financial investments | 0 | 0 |
| Cash and cash equivalents | 67 | 113 |
| Other short-term assets | 53 | 53 |
| Total Section II (short-term assets) | 5 220 | 5 982 |
| BALANCE (assets) | 15 783 | 16 856 |
| Charter capital | 9 145 | 9 145 |
| Reserve capital | 0 | 0 |
| Additional capital | 10 496 | 9 969 |
| Retained earnings (uncovered loss) | -9 549 | -8 758 |
| Total Section III (equity) | 10 092 | 10 356 |
| Long-term loans and borrowings | 300 | 820 |
| Long-term lease liabilities | 0 | 0 |
| Deferred income | 0 | 0 |
| Other long-term liabilities | 3 | 3 |
| Total Section IV (long-term liabilities) | 303 | 823 |
| Short-term loans and borrowings | 580 | 600 |
| Current portion of long-term liabilities | 240 | 780 |
| Short-term payables | 4 524 | 4 286 |
| — to suppliers, contractors, providers | 2 986 | 3 006 |
| — on payroll | 144 | 116 |
| — on lease payments | 0 | 0 |
| Deferred income | 44 | 11 |
| Total Section V (short-term liabilities) | 5 388 | 5 677 |
| BALANCE (equity and liabilities) | 15 783 | 16 856 |
Computed metrics
Integrity checks
Checks passed: 6 of 6
Signals
- Real equity sign-flip 2024→2025: F1.410+F1.460 = +387 (2024) → -404 (2025), crossed zero downward. F1.490 is positive only via revaluation F1.450 = 10,496 (104% of F1.490). An automatic distress flag on long-term-asset coverage — real equity negative.
- Long-term-asset coverage on real capital <0 (-0.0096) — a structural funding gap: real equity + long-term liabilities do not cover long-term assets. The long-term funding gap of ~101k BYN is covered by paper revaluation.
- Operating loss deepening: F2.060 -1,255 → -2,137 (-70%); F2.090 -966 → -1,908 (-98%). Cost structure broken: on revenue +26.81%, admin expenses +26.4% and selling expenses +70.8% — not leverage, but cost bloat.
- OCF reversal from positive to negative: F4.040 +202 → -6. Operating cash generation no longer self-financing even at break-even. Cash buffer 67k BYN vs operational outflow 12,765/365 ≈ 35/day → ~2 days cash runway.
- K1 current ratio fell below norm: 1.0537 → 0.9688 (norm ≥1.25). Current assets 5,220 do not cover current liabilities 5,388 — a formal sign of insolvency on short-term obligations.
- K1 SOS deep production-norm violation: -0.0902 (norm ≥0.15). No own working capital — operations financed entirely through short-term liabilities (mainly payables to suppliers 2,986).
- Net loss 'improvement' masked by F2.122 windfall +1,136 (vs 0 prior). Without this one-time income, net profit would be ~-1,930 (a deeper loss than 2024). The sustainable profit side deteriorated.
- Accumulated loss deepening three years: -7,842 (2023) → -8,758 (2024) → -9,549 (2025). 2024 increment: -916 (loss + minor adjustments); 2025: -791 (loss -794 + +3 transfer). Steady trend, masked via revaluation that works only while assets can be revalued up.
- Cash position weak: 67k BYN vs ST obligations 5,388 = 1.2% buffer. If supplier creditors (2,986) or the tax authority (63) demand accelerated payment — immediate cash shortage. The operating cycle depends heavily on supplier commercial credit (payables +0.7% pa stable, not growing, but not shrinking either).
- Profit-tax and social-security payables declining (633: 89→63; 634: 32→37) — but the baseline tax balances suggest payments are mostly current. Wages payable F1.635 144 vs 116 prior — a small rise, a sub-month buffer.
- Finished-goods stocks down 14.8%: F1.214 2,808 → 2,392. On revenue +27% this may be destocking (sold accumulated stock), but may also mean a production decline. Without Notes 138372 the interpretation is unclear. If destocking — a one-time benefit; if a production decline on rising nominal revenue — that is a price increase, not volume growth.
- Receivables down 18%: F1.250 1,380 → 1,130. Against revenue +27% — positive (collection improved). But combined with falling F1.270 (113 → 67) — it means the cash collected went to cost coverage, not to strengthening the cash position.
- F2.122 'other finance-activity income' share = 1,136 in 2025 against 0 in 2024 — a sharp one-time jump. Possible sources: FX gain (but F2.121 FX income = 1 BYN), revaluation of short-term financial investments, disposal of investments, a non-standard operation. Not explainable without Notes 138372. Yellow because it is a fundamentally unstable component of the result structure.
- Auditor — IE Telpuk Alexander Petrovich (Baranovichi district) — an individual-entrepreneur auditor. The audit includes a qualification ('except for the effect of the matter described in the Basis for Qualified Opinion section'). A modified opinion — not adverse, but not clean. The content of the qualification is unavailable in the main file (Audit 139364 deferred); requires partnered review to interpret its significance.
- Total debt load significantly reduced: 1,420 (2024) → 880 (2025) = -38%. Long-term debt F1.510 320→300; short-term loan F1.610 600→580; current portion of long-term F1.620 780→240 (-69%). Term restructuring or organic paydown via financing-activity cash flow (F4.091 = 843). Disciplined deleveraging.
- Revenue strong nominal growth: +26.81% YoY (9,676 vs 7,630). With BY inflation 5-7% real growth ~+20% — demand for the product (brick, tile) exists and is growing. Means: the market is not shrinking, market access is not lost (the domestic Belarus construction market keeps functioning).
- K3 debt dynamics -38% — a significant positive structural movement. Total interest expense F2.131 27→28 stable (did not rise despite inflation) — means the effective rate fell OR the debt mix shifted toward low-interest financing (likely state programs supporting the construction sector).
- Dividends not paid (F3.166=0, F4.092=0, accrued 0/0) — consistent with the operating loss + accumulated loss. No value extracted despite distress — the state (100% owner) is not yet demanding a return on capital.
- Adjustments in F3 minimal: 130 'corrections of errors' = -2 (retained) → no large bookkeeping shocks. No reorganizations recorded in F3.057 / F3.067 / F3.157 / F3.167. Means: the enterprise is not in active structural restructuring (unlike some distressed peers in the sample), which simplifies any future restructuring program.
Recommendation
OJSC "Gorynsky KSM" is a small (balance sheet BYN 15.8m) manufacturing enterprise of building materials (brick, tiles from fired clay, OKED 23.32), located in a rural area — the settlement of Rechitsa, Stolin district, Brest region. 100% state-owned, 3 shareholders, a working product in demand (2025 revenue +26.81% YoY = real growth ~+20% against Belarusian inflation of 5–7%). At the structural level the enterprise is at a transition point: real equity in 2024 was still positive (+BYN 387k), but in 2025 crossed zero downward (−BYN 404k), and F1.490 is positive only via revaluation F1.450 = 10,496 (104% of equity). The automatic distress flag on long-term-asset coverage is active (real equity < 0).
The 2025 operating picture simultaneously shows deterioration (F2.060 operating loss deepened −1,255 → −2,137, OCF reversed +202 → −6, current K1 fell below norm 1.05 → 0.97, K1 OWC a deep production-norm violation −0.09) and positive structural shifts (debt cut 38%: 1,420 → 880, strong nominal revenue growth, payables to suppliers stable, no dividends paid). Net loss formally improved (−955 → −794), but this improvement rests almost entirely on a one-time income F2.122 = 1,136 (vs 0 prior) — without this windfall, net profit would be ~−1,930 (worse than 2024).
Recommendation — restructuring / problematic / MEDIUM-LOW. Not privatization: with negative real equity and a deepening operating loss, buyers will not take the enterprise without a significant discount and recapitalization; revenue growth alone does not make the enterprise sellable. Not liquidation: the operating base is viable (real revenue growth +20%, the product is in demand, the audit is modified but not adverse), the social risk in a small rural settlement (Rechitsa, Stolin district) is significant, and debt-reduction discipline is visible. Not state investment in pure form: for large capital investment the enterprise is too small, and the current cost structure does not yet allow payback. Restructuring should start with cost discipline (administrative expenses +26% and selling expenses +71% against revenue +27% — disproportionate growth), then — analysis of the revaluation reserve (is the value of fixed assets of 9,933 real amid falling demand for outdated brick-production technologies?), and in perspective — a program of phased write-down of the accumulated loss against operational profit (when it appears).
Confidence MEDIUM-LOW. Financial data clean: 6/6 sanity checks pass given the H1d sign-restoration interpretation, the arithmetic chains close (F2, F3, F4 all verified). But context factors lower confidence: (1) a source-quality issue — the systematic missing-minus-sign convention requires careful interpretation, raising the risk of misreading in any review; (2) the audit is qualified, the content of the qualification not available in the main source; (3) the F2.122 windfall of 1,136 without explanation in the main source; (4) the typology hierarchy (district vs oblast) is assumed by context, not confirmed by explicit references to a parent organ.