Profitagro-BEL
OJSC "Profitagro-BEL"
UNP: 600028840 · 38 Lenin St., Shchitkovichi agro-town, Shchitkovichi rural council, Starye Dorogi District, Minsk Region 222920
Identification
Financial statements
k BYN
| Line item | Reporting year | Prior year |
|---|---|---|
| Fixed assets | 42 568 | 40 443 |
| Intangible assets | — | — |
| Income-bearing investments in tangible assets | — | — |
| Investments in long-term assets | 63 | 40 |
| Long-term financial investments | — | — |
| Long-term receivables | 59 | 69 |
| Total Section I (long-term assets) | 42 690 | 40 552 |
| Inventories | 17 481 | 16 441 |
| — materials | 4 721 | 4 820 |
| — work in progress | 1 107 | 1 062 |
| — finished goods and merchandise | 149 | 11 |
| — goods shipped | — | — |
| Deferred expenses | 25 | 67 |
| VAT on acquired goods, works, services | 1 578 | 2 990 |
| Short-term receivables | 850 | 758 |
| Short-term financial investments | — | — |
| Cash and cash equivalents | 65 | 259 |
| Other short-term assets | — | — |
| Total Section II (short-term assets) | 19 999 | 20 515 |
| BALANCE (assets) | 62 689 | 61 067 |
| Charter capital | 8 245 | 8 245 |
| Reserve capital | — | — |
| Additional capital | 11 599 | 8 811 |
| Retained earnings (uncovered loss) | 24 118 | 23 891 |
| Total Section III (equity) | 43 962 | 40 947 |
| Long-term loans and borrowings | 6 883 | 7 751 |
| Long-term lease liabilities | 4 379 | 4 316 |
| Deferred income | — | — |
| Total Section IV (long-term liabilities) | 11 262 | 12 067 |
| Short-term loans and borrowings | 1 460 | 1 478 |
| Current portion of long-term liabilities | 207 | 207 |
| Short-term payables | 5 798 | 6 368 |
| — to suppliers, contractors, providers | 3 075 | 1 861 |
| — on payroll | 378 | 312 |
| — on lease payments | 1 499 | 1 881 |
| Total Section V (short-term liabilities) | 7 465 | 8 053 |
| BALANCE (equity and liabilities) | 62 689 | 61 067 |
Computed metrics
Integrity checks
Checks passed: 6 of 6
Signals
- Net-profit catastrophic collapse: 4,387 → 223 (-95% YoY), prior-year profit nearly wiped out
- K2_net compression -21.73pp (22.78% → 1.05%): catastrophic net-profitability erosion
- K2_sales compression -6.64pp (10.64% → 4.00%): operating margin halved by cost inflation
- Cash position collapse: 259 → 65k BYN (-75%), liquid reserves depleted
- One-off fixed-asset disposal loss: F2.111 1,333k BYN (×266 the prior year's 5) — unexplained large write-off
- K1_SOS below norm: 0.0636 vs 0.15 norm (0.42x under), permanent capital barely covers long-term assets
- Cost inflation outpacing revenue: cost of sales +20.4% vs revenue +9.8%, structural margin pressure
- FX-exposure loss: F2.133 other finance-activity expenses 1,078 (×∞ from 0 prior) — currency mismatch?
- Payables to suppliers +65% (1,861 → 3,075): possible payment delays to suppliers
- Dividend anomaly: the info-table declares 45.1 paid in 2025 (decision 22.03.2025 for 2024, due 22.04.2025), but F3.166=0 AND F4.092=0. Systemic across years (prior info-table 13 vs F4.092=1). The payment due date precedes the reporting date, so a timing shift does not explain it. An open methodology question remains — whether the info-table or the primary forms take precedence.
- Revenue real growth +9.81% (21,144 vs 19,255) — above BY inflation ~5-6%, real operating expansion
- K1 strong liquidity: 2.679 (2.14x norm), well-covered short-term obligations
- Permanent capital covers long-term assets at 1.294 ((F1.490+F1.590)/F1.190) — acceptable structural adequacy
- Capital growing +7.4% (40,947 → 43,962): equity expansion via revaluation 2,792 + retained 223
- Long-term liabilities declining -6.7% (12,067 → 11,262): responsible deleveraging — loans -11.2%
- OCF margin positive 9.66% (2,043 from operations): operations generate cash despite the profit collapse — operating engine intact
- Sanity 6/6 clean: balance + cash flow + capital all consistent, all internal arithmetic checks pass
- Dividends declared in info-table 45.1 (vs 13 prior year, +247%) — at minimum signals dividend-discipline intent (subject to verification of the dividend entries)
Recommendation
OJSC "Profitagro-BEL" is a district-level agricultural producer with a state share of 98.311%, located in the agro-town of Shchitkovichi, Starye Dorogi district, Minsk region; the activity profile is crop farming (grains, potatoes, vegetables) and livestock (cattle, milk). The enterprise historically existed as OJSC "Shchitkovichi" and changed its name to "Profitagro-BEL" in 2022–2023.
The 2025 financial profile shows a sharp paradox: while preserving an operationally healthy structure (K1=2.68 strong, OCF margin +9.66%, permanent capital covers long-term assets at 1.294 (near the norm), capital growing +7.4%, debt declining −9.6%), the enterprise experienced a catastrophic collapse in net profit — F2.210 net profit crashed from BYN 4,387k in 2024 to BYN 223k in 2025 (−95% YoY). The decomposition shows three drivers: (1) operating margin compression — cost of sales rose 20.4% against revenue +9.8%, lowering sales K2 from 10.64% to 4.00% (−6.64 pp); (2) a one-off write-off of fixed assets — F2.111 "expenses from disposal of fixed assets" was BYN 1,333k against BYN 5k a year earlier (×266); (3) currency losses — F2.133 "other expenses from financing activities" BYN 1,078k against zero prior. The combined effect of investing-financing activity is −BYN 1,902k against +968 a year earlier (a flip of −2,870).
Despite the dramatic profit decline, the operating engine remains intact: operating cash flow F4.040 was +BYN 2,043k (vs +2,972 prior, margin 9.66%), above the typical benchmark for the agro-sector. Capital grew 7.4% (40,947 → 43,962) mainly via revaluation of long-term assets (F2.220 +2,792, reflected in F3.152). Long-term liabilities shrank 6.7% (−BYN 805k), including active loan repayment F4.091 +38% (1,632 → 2,256) — the behavior of a responsible issuer, not an enterprise in distress.
Recommendation — privatization at a stable level with MEDIUM confidence. The logic: K1 strong (2.68 — 2.14× the norm), long-term-asset coverage by permanent capital near the norm, OCF positive, capital growing, debt declining, revenue growing in real terms — fundamentally this is not a candidate for restructuring/state_investment/liquidation, but an enterprise with the operating metrics of a working business amid a one-off profit failure. At the same time, the profit-collapse magnitude (−95%) rules out naive privatization without conditions — privatization should be accompanied by buyer obligations on cost discipline (cost-of-goods cap relative to pricing), an FX-hedging policy (given the currency losses of 1,078), and justification of the capital write-offs (what happened with the F2.111 assets of 1,333). District-level agribusiness is a competitive sector (many similar enterprises across Belarusian districts), and a 98.311% state presence is not justified by strategic importance; a sale to specialised operators with production-efficiency expertise — farming enterprises and private agribusinesses — is a path to improving the margin without loss of production output. A sale to a larger Belarusian player is excluded: in a competitive district agribusiness sector it would lead to undesirable market concentration, against the purpose of the reform. Any acquisition that could create a dominant position or raise economic-sovereignty concerns is assessed case-by-case by the National Asset Management Agency. The profile is close to Kamenets Rayagroservis (privatization, stable MEDIUM), though that one was a trading activity (purchase/sale of agrochemicals) and Profitagro is direct agricultural production: different sub-types but the same district-level agribusiness outcome category.
Confidence MEDIUM — not HIGH — because a 1-year snapshot with major profit volatility does not allow confidently separating one-off events (asset write-off + forex) from the start of structural deterioration (if cost inflation continues into 2026). The FY-2 baseline (2024) shows sound margins; the FY-1 snapshot (2025) shows the collapse; FY+1 (2026) data will be needed to validate what kind of year 2025 was. An expert review is prioritized on the divergence between long-term-asset coverage and own-working-capital provision, and on the dividend anomaly.