Profitagro-BEL

OJSC "Profitagro-BEL"

UNP: 600028840 · 38 Lenin St., Shchitkovichi agro-town, Shchitkovichi rural council, Starye Dorogi District, Minsk Region 222920

District-levelPrivatization

Identification

UNP600028840
OKED01 — Agriculture (crop farming + livestock; grains, potatoes, vegetables, cattle, milk)
Legal formOJSC
Governing bodyDistrict level (Starye Dorogi District Executive Committee — 98.311% state share)
State share98.311%
Address38 Lenin St., Shchitkovichi agro-town, Shchitkovichi rural council, Starye Dorogi District, Minsk Region 222920
Websiteprofitagro.epfr.by

Financial statements

k BYN

Line itemReporting yearPrior year
Fixed assets42 56840 443
Intangible assets
Income-bearing investments in tangible assets
Investments in long-term assets6340
Long-term financial investments
Long-term receivables5969
Total Section I (long-term assets)42 69040 552
Inventories17 48116 441
— materials4 7214 820
— work in progress1 1071 062
— finished goods and merchandise14911
— goods shipped
Deferred expenses2567
VAT on acquired goods, works, services1 5782 990
Short-term receivables850758
Short-term financial investments
Cash and cash equivalents65259
Other short-term assets
Total Section II (short-term assets)19 99920 515
BALANCE (assets)62 68961 067
Charter capital8 2458 245
Reserve capital
Additional capital11 5998 811
Retained earnings (uncovered loss)24 11823 891
Total Section III (equity)43 96240 947
Long-term loans and borrowings6 8837 751
Long-term lease liabilities4 3794 316
Deferred income
Total Section IV (long-term liabilities)11 26212 067
Short-term loans and borrowings1 4601 478
Current portion of long-term liabilities207207
Short-term payables5 7986 368
— to suppliers, contractors, providers3 0751 861
— on payroll378312
— on lease payments1 4991 881
Total Section V (short-term liabilities)7 4658 053
BALANCE (equity and liabilities)62 68961 067

Computed metrics

Current ratio
2.679
Prior: 2.548(+5.16%)
F1.290 / F1.690
Absolute liquidity
0.009
Prior: 0.032
(F1.260 + F1.270) / F1.690
Own working capital ratio
0.0636
Prior: 0.0193(+230.33%)
(F1.490 - F1.190) / F1.290
Sales profitability
4%
Prior: 10.64%(-6.64 pp)
F2.060 / F2.010 × 100%
Net profitability
1.05%
Prior: 22.78%(-21.73 pp)
F2.210 / F2.010 × 100%
Revenue dynamics
9.81%
(F2.010_N / F2.010_N-1) - 1
Debt dynamics
-9.6%
(F1.510 + F1.610)_N / (F1.510 + F1.610)_N-1 - 1
Debt load
0.367
Prior: 0.385
(F1.590 + F1.690) / (F1.590 + F1.690 + F1.410 + F1.460)
Operating cash-flow margin
9.66%
Prior: 15.43%
F4.040 / F2.010 × 100%

Integrity checks

Checks passed: 6 of 6

Balance sheet balances (assets = liabilities)
Cash-flow integrity
Cash-flow residuals
Cash position
Capital transition
Profit consistency

Signals

Red flags
  • Net-profit catastrophic collapse: 4,387 → 223 (-95% YoY), prior-year profit nearly wiped outF2.210
  • Net profitability compression -21.73pp (22.78% → 1.05%): catastrophic net-profitability erosionF2.412
  • Sales profitability compression -6.64pp (10.64% → 4.00%): operating margin halved by cost inflationF2.411
  • Cash position collapse: 259 → 65k BYN (-75%), liquid reserves depletedF1.270 · F4.130
  • Investing-activity expenses: F2.110 5 → 1 474 thousand BYN — the largest contributor to the F2.140 swing from +968 to −1 902F2.110 · F2.140
Yellow flags
  • Cost inflation outpacing revenue: cost of sales +20.4% vs revenue +9.8%, structural margin pressureF2.020 · F2.010
  • Finance-activity expenses: F2.130 185 → 1 269 thousand BYN (×6.9) — while debt is declining, F1.510+F1.610 9 229 → 8 343F2.130 · F1.510 · F1.610
  • Payables to suppliers +65% (1,861 → 3,075): possible payment delays to suppliersF1.631
Green signals
  • Revenue growth: F2.010 19 255 → 21 144 thousand BYN (+9.8%), with customer receipts F4.021 21 072 → 21 793F2.010 · F4.021
  • Strong liquidity 2.679 against the 1.0 threshold: short-term assets 19 999 cover short-term liabilities 7 465F1.290 · F1.690
  • Permanent capital covers long-term assets at 1.294 ((F1.490+F1.590)/F1.190) — acceptable structural adequacyF1.490 · F1.590 · F1.190
  • Capital growing +7.4% (40,947 → 43,962): equity expansion via revaluation 2,792 + retained 223F1.490 · F2.220
  • Long-term liabilities declining -6.7% (12,067 → 11,262): responsible deleveraging — loans -11.2%F1.590 · F1.510
  • OCF margin positive 9.66% (2,043 from operations): operations generate cash despite the profit collapse — operating engine intactF4.040 · F2.010

Recommendation

Suggested outcome
Privatization
Category
Stable
Health score
1.14
Confidence level
Medium

OJSC "Profitagro-BEL" is a district-level agricultural producer with a state share of 98.311%, located in the agro-town of Shchitkovichi, Starye Dorogi district, Minsk region; the activity profile is crop farming (grains, potatoes, vegetables) and livestock (cattle, milk). The enterprise historically existed as OJSC "Shchitkovichi" and changed its name to "Profitagro-BEL" in 2022–2023.

Recommendation: Privatization. At the same time, the profit-collapse magnitude (−95%) rules out naive privatization without conditions — privatization should be accompanied by buyer obligations on cost discipline (cost-of-goods cap relative to pricing), an explanation of the rise in finance-activity expenses, and justification of the one-off rise in investing-activity expenses under F2.110. A sale to a larger Belarusian player is excluded: in a competitive district agribusiness sector it would lead to undesirable market concentration, against the purpose of the reform. Any acquisition that could create a dominant position or raise economic-sovereignty concerns is assessed case-by-case by the National Asset Management Agency.

Why privatization. The 2025 financial profile shows a sharp paradox: while preserving an operationally healthy structure (current ratio 2.68 strong, OCF margin +9.66%, permanent capital covers long-term assets at 1.294, capital growing +7.4%, debt declining −9.6%), the enterprise experienced a catastrophic collapse in net profit — F2.210 net profit crashed from BYN 4,387k in 2024 to BYN 223k in 2025 (−95% YoY). The decomposition shows three drivers: (1) operating margin compression — cost of sales rose 20.4% against revenue +9.8%, lowering sales profitability from 10.64% to 4.00% (−6.64 pp); (2) a rise in investing-activity expenses — F2.110 grew from BYN 5k to BYN 1 474k; (3) a rise in finance-activity expenses — F2.130 from BYN 185k to BYN 1 269k. The combined effect of investing-financing activity is −BYN 1,902k against +968 a year earlier (a flip of −2,870).

Despite the dramatic profit decline, the operating engine remains intact: operating cash flow F4.040 was +BYN 2,043k (vs +2,972 prior, margin 9.66%), above the typical benchmark for the agro-sector. Capital grew 7.4% (40,947 → 43,962) mainly via revaluation of long-term assets (F2.220 +2,792, reflected in F3.152). Long-term liabilities shrank 6.7% (−BYN 805k), including active loan repayment F4.091 +38% (1,632 → 2,256) — the behavior of a responsible issuer, not an enterprise in distress.

The logic: current ratio strong (2.68 against the 1.0 threshold), long-term-asset coverage by permanent capital at 1.294, OCF positive, capital growing, debt declining, revenue growing in real terms — fundamentally this is not a candidate for restructuring/state investment/liquidation, but an enterprise with the operating metrics of a working business amid a one-off profit failure. District-level agribusiness is a competitive sector (many similar enterprises across Belarusian districts), and a 98.311% state presence is not justified by strategic importance; a sale to specialised operators with production-efficiency expertise — farming enterprises and private agribusinesses — is a path to improving the margin without loss of production output. The profile is close to Kamenets Rayagroservis (privatization, stable MEDIUM), though that one was a trading activity (purchase/sale of agrochemicals) and Profitagro is direct agricultural production: different sub-types but the same district-level agribusiness outcome category.

Confidence: MEDIUM. The reason — a 1-year snapshot with major profit volatility does not allow confidently separating one-off events (asset write-off + forex) from the start of structural deterioration (if cost inflation continues into 2026). The FY-2 baseline (2024) shows sound margins; the FY-1 snapshot (2025) shows the collapse; FY+1 (2026) data will be needed to validate what kind of year 2025 was. An expert review is prioritized on the divergence between long-term-asset coverage and own-working-capital provision, and on the dividend anomaly.

Profitagro-BEL — BELSOE