Soligorsk Motor Depot
OJSC "Soligorsk Motor Depot"
UNP: 600072668 · 1 Sitenetskaya St., Starobin urban settlement, Soligorsk District, Minsk Region 223730
Identification
Financial statements
k BYN
| Line item | Reporting year | Prior year |
|---|---|---|
| Fixed assets | 5 520 | 5 620 |
| Intangible assets | — | — |
| Income-bearing investments in tangible assets | — | — |
| Investments in long-term assets | — | — |
| Long-term financial investments | 5 | 5 |
| Long-term receivables | — | — |
| Total Section I (long-term assets) | 5 525 | 5 625 |
| Inventories | 225 | 184 |
| — materials | 225 | 184 |
| — work in progress | — | — |
| — finished goods and merchandise | — | — |
| — goods shipped | — | — |
| Deferred expenses | 23 | 24 |
| VAT on acquired goods, works, services | — | — |
| Short-term receivables | 1 783 | 1 905 |
| Short-term financial investments | — | — |
| Cash and cash equivalents | 1 | 2 |
| Other short-term assets | — | — |
| Total Section II (short-term assets) | 2 032 | 2 115 |
| BALANCE (assets) | 7 557 | 7 740 |
| Charter capital | 2 428 | 2 428 |
| Reserve capital | — | — |
| Additional capital | 2 378 | 1 995 |
| Retained earnings (uncovered loss) | 449 | 546 |
| Total Section III (equity) | 5 255 | 4 969 |
| Long-term loans and borrowings | 794 | 1 260 |
| Long-term lease liabilities | — | — |
| Deferred income | — | — |
| Total Section IV (long-term liabilities) | 794 | 1 260 |
| Short-term loans and borrowings | 602 | 742 |
| Current portion of long-term liabilities | 393 | 372 |
| Short-term payables | 513 | 397 |
| — to suppliers, contractors, providers | 108 | 70 |
| — on payroll | 122 | 125 |
| — on lease payments | — | — |
| Total Section V (short-term liabilities) | 1 508 | 1 511 |
| BALANCE (equity and liabilities) | 7 557 | 7 740 |
Computed metrics
Integrity checks
Checks passed: 6 of 6
Signals
- Net profit collapse -92.2% YoY: 359 → 28 (margin 5.58% → 0.44%, near-zero territory)
- K1_SOS provision violation: -0.133 (norm ≥0.15) — own working capital insufficient, a 0.27pp gap
- K2_sales halved: 14.44% → 7.26% (-7.18pp), a pricing-power-failure indicator
- Interest payable +40%: 205 → 288, on flat revenue + reducing long-term debt = expensive remaining debt
- Gross-margin collapse -5.8pp: 22.27% → 16.46% (cost of sales +7.5% on flat revenue)
- Permanent capital barely covers long-term assets — coverage 1.095 (near the lower 1.0-1.2 norm), trend deteriorating from 1.107
- K1 current trending down: 1.40 → 1.347 (-3.8%), still above the 1.25 norm but the buffer is shrinking
- Admin expenses +18%: 503 → 592 on flat revenue, OPEX inflation
- Receivables fell 1,905 → 1,783 (-6.4%) — positive in itself, but in the context of flat revenue may mean customer churn
- Massive refinancing cycle in F4: loans received 7,325 + repaid 7,903 (vs 2,081/1,031 prior) — debt fully rolled over, possibly under duress at +40% interest
- OCF margin strong AND improving: 17.10% (vs 10.73% prior, +6.37pp), F4.040=1,100 vs 690 (+59% YoY) — operating soundness confirmed by cash, not just paper profit
- Total debt reduced -30.3%: 2,002 → 1,396 (F1.510+F1.610), deliberate deleveraging management
- Sanity checks 6/6 ✓ — statements internally consistent, audit clean (IE Shatilo, opinion 'fairly presented in all material respects')
- Long-term-asset coverage maintained above 1.0: permanent capital still covers long-term assets (marginally, 1.095x), the structural concern did not materialize
- 100% state share + dividends payable (F4.092 = 125): not in financial distress, the state earns a return from the holding
- Cash position stable: F1.270 = 1 (very low absolute but positive, normal for a transport JSC with a tight working-capital cycle)
- No subsidies (F1.480 = null, no targeted financing) — operates without any dependence on targeted state support
Recommendation
The enterprise presents a paradoxical profile: operational soundness is confirmed by strong cash flow (OCF margin 17.1%, +6.4 pp YoY, absolute F4.040 +59% over prior), yet accounting profit collapsed −92.2% (net profit 28 vs 359). The divergence is explained by a failure of pricing power: with flat revenue (+0.06%), cost of sales rose +7.5%, eroding gross margin from 22.3% to 16.5%; interest payable rose +40% (288 vs 205) on stagnating income. Management is pursuing a deliberate deleveraging — total debt cut −30.3% (from BYN 2,002k to 1,396k), evidence of financial discipline, but the rising cost of the remaining debt is eating into profitability.
Recommendation — privatization, distressed tier, MEDIUM confidence. Rationale: (1) a district-level enterprise in the competitive road-freight sector with no strategic monopoly value — state retention is not justified by sector logic; (2) 100% state share + an established dividend history = a clean divestment candidate; (3) OCF strength gives a buyer working-capital headroom for margin restructuring; (4) the deleveraging trajectory shows competent management — an actively managed asset for sale, not a distress sale. Conditions for a buyer: cost discipline (fuel/payroll/leasing), pricing-strategy review (the current inability to pass through cost inflation = the key operational risk), a capex plan for fleet renewal (F1.110 = 5,520, fleet age TBD via notes). MEDIUM-LOW confidence is driven by: trajectory uncertainty in profit recovery, the absence of a visible margin-stabilization signal over 2 cycles, marginal-low long-term-asset coverage (1.095×), and dependence on sector-wide pricing-power restoration (which may come from market consolidation OR may not come).